Abstract-Market mechanisms have been exploited as important means for spectrum acquisition and access in cognitive radio networks. In this paper, we propose a two-tier market for decentralized dynamic spectrum access. In the proposed Tier-1 market, spectrum is traded from a primary user (PU) to secondary users (SUs) in a relatively large time scale to reduce signaling overhead. Then driven by dynamic traffic demands, SUs set up the Tier-2 market to redistribute channels among themselves in a small time scale. More specifically, we use Nash bargain game to model the spectrum acquisition of SUs in the Tier-1 market and derive the equilibrium prices. We then use strategic bargain game to study the spectrum redistribution in the Tier-2 market, where SUs can exchange channels with low overhead through random matching, bilateral bargain, and the predetermined market equilibrium prices. We disclose how various factors, such as availability of channels and bargain partners, matching schemes, and traffic dynamics, impact the market relationships. This work provides better understanding on the spectrum market and valuable guidelines to primary and secondary network operators.
I. Introduction
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) enabled by cognitive radio technology has the great potential to alleviate spectrum scarcity. A popular paradigm of DSA is where secondary users (SUs) opportunistically access under-utilized primary user (PU) spectrum. In this paradigm, marketbased mechanisms have been widely studied because they provide incentives for PUs.
Among those proposed market approaches, auction is believed to be effective for spectrum distribution. The current research works, e.g., in [1] [16] , target the short-term and on-demand spectrum distribution in small regions, with spectrum reuse considered, which is more flexible than the traditional FCC-style auction. Pricing mechanisms are also well studied, where a server determines the prices for SUs to access, e.g., in [8] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
However, the current approaches have limitations. Consider auction. Current works promote on-demand auctions where a SU can request bandwidth according to its traffic demands. However, the time overhead inherent in the auction procedure, including market setup time, bidding time, and pricing clearing time, hampers the timely satisfaction of SU traffic demands, which often change in a small time scale, e.g., in multimedia communications. Moreover, auction loses its merits and becomes less efficient when there are only a few bidders. Pricing mechanisms may incur low signaling overhead since SUs are not involved in determining prices. However, a centralized server is needed to handle SUs' admission control, to calculate the prices, and to charge the SUs. Therefore they are difficult to be applied in a scenario where SUs are in an ad hoc manner.
Observing the limitations, we propose a two-tier market
The work was in part supported by NSF through CAREER Award #0448613 and Grant #0520126, and by Intel through a gift grant. structure based on the decentralized bargain theory to enable distributed DSA. The two-tier structure is motivated by the fact that spectrum trade from PUs to SUs often incurs relatively large singling overhead, since users usually need the information of supplies and demands to determines prices. In our Tier-1 market, spectrum is traded from a PU to SUs that targets a relatively large time scale contracts to reduce the signaling overhead. The SUs that leave the Tier-1 market with channels then enter the Tier-2 market, which is driven by the dynamic traffic demands of SUs that vary in a small time scale. In the Tier-2 market, spectrum is redistributed from the SUs with more channels (than that demanded by their current traffic) to those with less channels. By random matching, bilateral bargain, and the predetermined market equilibriums prices, the overhead is significantly reduced in the Tier-2 market compared to auction markets. A SU only needs to match with another SU and exchange the market type information. Both the Tier-1 and Tier-2 markets are in distributed manners. We note that the Tier-1 market can be implemented by auction schemes. But bargain exhibits new spirits, including 1) decentralized structure, i.e., a PU and a SU is matched randomly, and there is no centralized auctioneer needed; and 2) scalability, i.e., multiple PUs and SUs can be involved, which can be referred to [19] .
Our key contributions are summarized as follows. 1. We propose a two-tier market structure which targets large time scale spectrum contracts from a PU to SUs in Tier-1, and small time scale spectrum redistribution among SUs to satisfy SUs' dynamic traffic demands in Tier-2.
2. We use Nash bargain game to model the bilateral bargain problem between a PU with multiple channels and multiple SUs in the Tier-1 market. We further derive the market equilibriums for different matching schemes. Our problem is different from existing works on Nash bargain markets [19] where a seller only has one piece of goods.
3. We propose the Tier-2 market with a distributed and random matching structure. We use strategic bargain game to model the transactions among SUs. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm to derive the market equilibriums under two matching schemes. 4 . We show how the market role of each type of users and the market equilibrium are affected by different factors, such as channel availability, matching scheme, and traffic dynamics.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system models. In Section III, we study the Tier-1 market using Nash bargain game. In Section IV, we study the Tier-2 market using strategic bargain game. Numerical evaluation is in Section V, followed by the related work in Section VI and conclusions in Section VII.
II. Preliminaries and System Models
We consider one primary spectrum license holder with a block of spectrum in a large geographical region, e.g., a TV service provider who broadcasts on a set of TV channels and serves a large area. A number of SUs are located in the same area. The PU and SU models are as follows.
PU model: PU traffic on a channel follows the ON-OFF model. We assume the idle time of PU channels is in a relatively large time scale, e.g., in the order of hours.
SU model: We assume that each SU is selfish and seeks to maximize its own utility. Each SU is equipped with a cognitive radio and can use up to N PU channels. We consider SU traffic dynamics. Assume that the SU networks are time-slotted, with a slot length of T s . Traffic state changes at the boundary of a time slot and remains constant during one time slot. We use j to denote the traffic state of a SU, 0 ≤ j ≤ N , which represents the number of channels needed to satisfy the traffic. Let ρ jj denote the transition probability from state j to j . To simplify the calculation, we assume each SU have the same traffic transition probability matrix. We leave the heterogenous traffic transition case in the future work. The time scale of SU traffic dynamics is relatively small, e.g., in the order of hundreds of milliseconds of multimedia communications.
The area that the PU spectrum owner covers is divided into a number of cells. In each cell, the PU spectrum owner places an agent, named PUA, to handle spectrum transactions. We consider the market of a single cell.
In the Tier-1 market, a PUA generates contracts on a number of idle channels every T c time and sells them to SUs. T c is in the order of the idle time of PU channels and is much larger than T s . Then, due to dynamic SUs' traffic demands, the Tier-2 market is formed to exchange channels among SUs in each SU time slot. The Tier-1 market is a one-time market since a SU leaves when it obtains a set of channels, while the Tier-2 market is a repeated market since traffic varies from slot to slot.
We use Nash bargain game and strategic bargain game to investigate the market equilibriums of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 markets, respectively. Nash bargain game captures the notion of social efficiency and fairness [19] . The solution is to maximize the product of all players' gains over the outcome of the disagreement. Nash bargain is simple, unique, and avoids any specification of the bargain procedure. The models of the strategic bargain game embody detailed bargain procedure, where a proposer starts the game by proposing a price and the responder accepts or rejects it. In the Tier-1 market, we apply Nash bargain game because in this market, the bargain is a one-time action between a seller and a buyer, and thus it is more reasonable to implement a game driven by the players' attitude toward the risk of breakdown, which is central in the Nash bargain game. In the Tier-2 market, a SU can bargain with different types of SUs in different time slots.
The attitude toward risk of breakdown is not as essential as the Tier-1 market. In this case, it is more interesting to explicitly model the strategic consideration of abandoning the current partner and finding new partners. Moreover, it is hard to specify the outcomes of disagreement in the Tier-2 market that is needed in the Nash bargain game.
In bargain, a public value is assumed for a given piece of goods, e.g., a channel in our case. Based on the public value, a seller and a buyer negotiate a price. In practice, a PU or a SU may have its private value of a channel at a given time, e.g., due to channel diversity. In this paper, we consider the transmission reward of a SU in a slot normalized over channel quality, denoted by R, as a public value of a channel, which can also be measured by the PU. Note in [5] , the authors also assume the distribution of the private value of a SU is known publicly. In the Tier-1 market, we use U as the public value of a piece of goods (a number of channels). The value U is regarded as the sum of SUs' transmission rewards over the transmission time T c . Therefore, in the Tier-1 market, for a piece of goods that consists of n channels, we have U = nR Tc Ts . III. Tier-1 market: The PU-SU bargain market A. Models
In Tier-1, a piece of goods is defined as a fixed number of channels, lasting T c time. There are totally N s SUs, each desires one piece of goods. In practice, SUs may request different numbers of channels. With some modifications, our approach can still be applied. We leave it to our future work.
The Tier-1 market has multiple negotiation time slots. In a negotiation time slot, the PUA and a SU set up a transaction through a control channel. The communication between the PUA and SUs can be based on a contention MAC protocol, or a contention-free protocol, e.g., the PUA selects each SU sequentially. Note the control channel may also be shared by other networks. We use θ to denote the probability that a transaction is successfully set up in a slot. We have 0 < θ ≤ 1.
A SU that obtains a piece of goods will leave the market. Given there are n s SUs in the market, the probability that a SU is matched with the PUA to conduct the current transaction is 1 ns . If the PUA and a SU cannot reach an agreement in the current transaction, we consider two possible consequences: 1) Case I: The SU still enjoys the same chance of bargaining with the PUA in the future as other SUs that have not been engaged; 2) Case II: The PUA refuses to bargain with the SU again. We refer to these two cases as different matching schemes, which result in different market equilibriums.
We use Nash bargain game to determine the market equilibrium for each transaction. Nash bargain solution (NBS) maximizes the product of players' utility gain over their disagreement outcomes. Therefore, for each transaction, we need to specify the outcome of disagreement. The PUA and the SUs often have time preference on the transactions. We use a constant 0 < γ < 1 to discount the future utilities of both the PUA and the SUs.
Although we only consider one seller in the Tier-1 mar-ket, the market is scalable to the case with multiple sellers and buyers 1 . To the best of our knowledge, the current works on decentralized Nash bargain market only consider where a seller has one piece of goods [19] . We consider a seller with multiple pieces of goods, which is more suitable for spectrum trading and more challenging to study.
B. Market equilibriums
We consider the market equilibrium for each transaction the PUA and SUs conducted. A candidate for market equilibriums is a function f that either assigns a transaction a price p or a disagreement D. There are three possibilities for the disagreement D: 1) when both the PUA and the SU choose disagreement, D = D ps ; 2) when the PUA disagrees, D = D p ; and 3) when the SU disagrees, D = D s . The three cases have the same result, i.e., no goods is exchanged and both the parties receive a utility of 0 from the current transaction. However, they come from different situations that the PUA and the SU face. The function f determines the outcome of the current transaction between the PUA and the SU. Therefore, f relates to the current market setting (n c , n s ), i.e., the number of pieces of goods n c , and the number of SUs n s .
If f = D, the engaged SU does not leave the market in Case I, and leaves in Case II. The difference is whether the SU considers the future utility in determining f for the current transaction or not. If the PUA pretends to have only one piece of goods to sell in each transaction, it does not consider the utility from future transactions. We consider this case later. We first focus on the scenario where the PUA discloses the true value of n c to SUs
In Case I, when the current market setting is (n c , n s ), we use V p (n c , n s ) and V s (n c , n s ) to denote the expected utility of the PUA and a SU, respectively. If the PUA and the SU agree on a price p(n c , n s ), the market setting evolves to (n c − 1, n s − 1) since the SU leaves with one piece of goods. Since the number of slots needed to successfully set up the next transaction, denoted by m t , is a geometrically distributed random variable with parameter θ, we can write
, where γ mt is the discount factor when the delay is m t , and (1 − θ) mt−1 θ is its probability. The utility of the leaving SU is U − p(n c , n s ). In the case of f = D, the market setting remains as (n c , n s ). But all the transactions are delayed by m t slots. Therefore, the disagreement leads to a utility pair of (
We define the market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1: In Case I, for a market setting of
where 1 It is reasonable to apply NBS, since there may be multiple PUA competing in the market.
and
(6) Similarly, in Case II:
( 9) and
Remark: In (4), both parties choose to disagree if they are potentially better off than to agree. The PUA chooses D p if its utility is negative. A SU chooses D s if p * (n c , n s ) > U since otherwise it gets a negative utility. In Definition 1, the PUA may agree on a price p * (m, n) < 0 since the PUA can potentially obtain positive utility from future transactions, which is different from the classical model of bargaining on one piece of goods where a price p is required in [0, U]. In Case II, the disagreement results in a utility pair of (δV p (n c , n s − 1), 0), since the engaged SU must leave the market under disagreement. Therefore, D ps is inherently included by D s because the SU's utility cannot be better off.
Meanwhile, we have the following equations for Case I and Case II according to (1) (2)(3) and (7)(8), respectively.
In Case I: . In Case II:
Proof: See technical report [20] (15) (16) (17) , by which V p (n c , n s ) ≥ 0.
Proof: Please refer to the technical report [20] . Note the proof of Proposition 1 is non-trivial for both Case I and II, since the interactions among V p (n c , n s ), V s (n c , n s ), and p * (n c , n s ) are complex. In addition, for Case I, when 0.82 < δ < 1, we numerically studied the market equilibriums prices, and found that (11)(12)(13)(14) always lead to a market equilibrium price.
The cases that PUA does not consider future utility: We also study the case where the PUA pretends to have only one piece of goods to sell in each transaction and does not consider the future utility. Further, there are two cases under disagreement. Case III: the SU stays in the market. Case IV: the SU leaves. The results on the market equilibrium price are referred to [20] . In Section V, we compare the market equilibrium prices in all four cases and disclose how the market power of the PUA and SUs differs in each case. Intuitively, refusing to bargain with the SU again under disagreement enhances the power of the PUA and therefore leads to a higher price in the current transaction. So does pretending to only have one piece of goods.
IV. Tier-2 market-A traffic driven SU market
In the Tier-1 market, a SU obtains a number of channels which remain effective for T c time. If a SU buys n channels and pays p to the PUA, its cost in using a channel for one SU slot is C p = pTs nTc . A SU's state in a time slot is characterized by (i, j), where i is the number of channels and j is the traffic demands of the SU, 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Recall that R denotes the reward that a SU reaps by transmitting on one channel per time slot. We can write the utility of a SU in state (i, j) for one time slot.
where min(i, j)R is the transmission reward and iC P is the channel cost. Since R > C p (In the Tier-1 market, p * (n c , n s ) < U, which is equivalent to R > C p ), by (18) , given j, a SU's utility is maximized in a slot if i = j. Therefore, in the beginning of a time slot, when i > j, the SU has incentive to sell channels to other SUs. When i < j, the SU has incentive to buy channels from other SUs to satisfy its traffic demand. Then a SU-SU bargain market is formed among the SUs. This is the Tier-2 market, driven by the traffic dynamics of SUs.
A. Models
Recall that the SU networks are time slotted and a SU's traffic state transits in the beginning of a slot. Since in the Tier-1 market, the prices for different SUs may be different, which results in different C p , we let those SUs have the same or similar C p entering the same Tier-2 market. Note in our simulations, we observe that the Tier-1 market equilibrium prices are very close.
We classify SUs in the market according to their states, i.e., (i, j). Therefore, there are (N +1) 2 types of SUs in the market, each of which has a unique market role in channel exchange. A SU's type varies in different slots. Note SUs have different experiences of market types, since they may enter the market with different initial states, bargain with SUs with different states, or stay in the market for different time durations. We consider SUs with i < j as buyers, and those with i > j as sellers. The number of channels of SUs with i = j does not change.
A SU randomly probes another SU for a potential trade over a control channel. This is referred to as the matching phase and takes a small duration in the beginning of a slot. Without specifying a concrete underlying MAC protocol, we simply assume that a SU is successfully matched with another one with probability ϑ, which is the same for each SU in each slot. A longer matching phase leads to a larger ϑ and thereby higher probability of channel exchange, at the cost of reduced transmission time. We do not address the problem of finding the optimal time for the matching phase in the paper.
Conditional on the event of being matched, the probability that a SU is matched with a type-(i, j) SU is equal to the fraction of the population of the type-(i, j) SUs in the market, denoted by π ij . The set {π ij } describes the distribution of market states. We first assume {π ij } are stationary in each slot and present a theoretical framework that determines a set of static prices. We further discuss the evolution of the market states and how to determine {π ij } given an initial market state and traffic transition probabilities.
We use the strategic bargain game to determine the outcome of each encounter between a matched pair. In the strategic bargain game, there are two players: a proposer whose action is to propose a price on a number of goods, and a responder whose action is either to accept or to reject the proposed price. A SU in a matched pair either plays as a proposer or a responder, each with probability 0.5. To be a proposer is often more beneficial in the market. Although this paper assumes each SU is honest, in our technical report [20] , we describe an encryption protocol based on Hash function without a third party to enforce equal opportunities of being a proposer, when SUs are not honest. Under agreement, a seller sells a number of channels permanently to a buyer, who can resell them later.
We next characterize the number of channels exchanged, denoted by χ kl ij , between a type-(i, j) and a type-(k, l) SU. We have χ kl ij = 0 only when i < j, k > l or i > j, k < l holds. We consider the following scheme that aggressively encourages channel trade. Initially, we set χ kl ij as
By (19) , at least one SU's current traffic demand is satisfied with equality. Moreover, the total welfare of the matched pair in the current slot is maximized. However, the future traffic states may undermine the incentives of exchanging χ kl ij channels in the current slot. Our framework incorporates the future states in determining the number of channels exchanged among any two types of SUs. As specified later, a type-(i, j) SU and a type-(k, l) SU may not reach a market equilibrium price by a χ kl ij . In this case, we reduce χ kl ij by 1 and let them be less aggressive in channel exchange, until they reach a market equilibrium.
When a matched pair agrees on a price, the transaction is successfully concluded, and the pair breaks down. Each party continues to randomly probe a SU in the market in the next slot. The pair is not restored even both the parties are not newly matched 2 . If a pair does not reach an agreement in a slot, each party also continues to probe a SU in the next slot. We consider two different cases if both SUs are unmatched in the next slot. 1) Case I: Both SUs remain unmatched. 2) Case II: The pair is restored and the SUs continue to bargain (Note a little more communication overhead is incurred here than in Case I). The division of the two cases are similar to the two different matching schemes in the Tier-1 market. Intuitively, not restoring the relationship under disagreement enhances the market power of a proposer in the current transaction, which is similar to the effect of PUA's refusing to bargain with the SU again under disagreement in the Tier-1 market.
B. Market Equilibriums
We define a type of SU's strategy as a function that assigns to every possible match either a price or a response, according to the type of SU's role in the match. We consider stationary strategies. That is, a type of SUs use the same rule of behavior in every encounter with the same type of the bargain partner. Further, we define the market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2: A market equilibrium is a pair of stationary strategies that is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the bilateral bargain game between a matched pair.
In extensive-form games, the notion of SPE rules out the potential "incredible threat" and thereby enhances the desirability of the strategies compared to the Nash equilibrium. The readers can refer to [19] for the formal definition and more applications in the bargain games. For the sake of efficiency in channels exchange, we restrict our attention to the SPE strategies that rule out the action of rejection. Specifically, similar to Theorem 3.4 of the bargaining game of alternative offer in Chapter 3 of [19] , we derive a SPE strategy where the optimal price that a type-(i, j) SU proposes to a type-(k, l) SU, denoted by P kl ij , is accepted immediately; meanwhile, the optimal price that the type-(k, l) ask for, denoted by A kl ij , is accepted by the type-(i, j) SU. Both of them represent the amount of money that a type (i, j)-SU gives to a type-(k, l) SU. Note P
The SPEs are different in the two matching schemes we consider.
B.1 Case I
Since T s T c , we assume an infinite time horizon in Tier-2. Then a type of SU's utility is independent of the time slots with stationary strategies. We consider the utility of a SU as the sum of the utility in the current slot and future slots. We discount the future utility by a factor α, which can also be regarded as the probability that a SU stays in the market in the next slot. A SU obtains revenues from two aspects: transmission and bargain. We can write the utility of a type-(i, j) SU when it is unmatched in a slot as (20) where λ ij is the utility from the current slot by (18) . In the next slot, the type-(i, j) SU's traffic transits to state j with probability ρ jj . Then, as a type-(i, j ) SU, it will be matched with a type-(k, l) SU with probability ϑπ kl , or remain unmatched with probability 1 − ϑ. In (20), we use ϕ kl ij to denote the expected utility of a type-(i, j ) SU when it is matched with a type-(k, l) SU. We can write ϕ kl ij as
where
is the expected payment from the type-(i, j) SU to the type-(k, l) SU, φ kl ij = φ i j and i is the new channel state of the type-(i, j) SU after it bargains with the type-(k, l) SU, i.e.,
We next characterize the SPE price. When a type-(i, j) SU is a proposer and offers a price P kl ij to a type-(k, l) SU, the type-(k, l) SU only accepts P kl ij if the resulted utility is no less than that of rejection, by which in this case the type-(k, l) SU does not continue to bargain with the type-(i, j) SU even when both are unmatched in the next slot. Therefore, the resulted utility is simply φ kl . Then by backward induction, the optimal price that the type-(i, j) proposes should satisfy
When a type-(i, j) SU is a responder, we have
To constitute a SPE, meanwhile, a type-(i, j) and a type-(k, l) SU should be willing to propose P 
Combining (22) and (23), both of the inequalities in (24) are equivalent to
Combining (20) − φ kl < 0, it implies that the current channel exchange does not favor the future utility due to traffic transition. This is the intuition that we reduce χ kl ij to reach market equilibrium. The market equilibriums have a nice property that the sum of the welfare of a matched pair must be better off.
B.2 Case II
In this case, if the responder rejects the proposed price, the bargain relationship either breaks down or continues in the next slot. We first consider the event of breakdown. Since the probability of a SU being newly matched in the next slot is ϑ, the probability of breakdown under disagreement is ϑ b = 1 − (1 − ϑ) 2 . Conditional on the event of breakdown, a type-(i, j) SU is either newly matched, w.p., ϑ ϑb , or unmatched, w.p.,
. Therefore, we can write the utility incurred by breakdown as A type-(i, j) SU matched with a type-(k, l) SU proposes a price P kl ij . As in Case I, the optimal P kl ij makes the type-(k, l) SU choose to accept if the resulted utility is no less than that of the rejection. Different from Case I, the utility of the rejection is potentially from two aspects. One is resulted from breakdown, i.e., ω ij . The other is from the transaction continued in the next slot, where the traffic states of both the type-(i, j) SU and type-(k, l) SU transit to j and l , respectively. Hence we have
(27) Similarly, we can write the equation on A kl ij as
(28) Combining (20)(21)(26)(27)(28) To simplify the problem, we can modify (27)(28) to let P Output the market equilibrium prices P kl ij and A kl ij .
14: end if
In Algorithm 1, the calculation of market states {π ij } can be referred to the subsection of market evolution in the technical report [20] . We give a simple sketch here. Given an initial channel and traffic state, and traffic transition probabilities, the expected market states in slot t, i.e., {π ij (t)} only depends on {π i,j (t − 1)}, and can be calculated from {π ij (0)}. We have π ij =
Ts Tc
Tc Ts t=0 π ij (t). Note π ij (t) is an expected value rather than an instance 3 . A SU cannot know the market states in slot t. By π ij , we are able to determine a set of fixed prices that SUs can follow, which results in a low market overhead compared to the market with price dynamics.
Proposition 2: Algorithm 1 computes market equilibrium prices for both Case I and Case II in polynomial time.
Proof: Please refer to the technical report [20] . Remark: In our simulations, we observe that for both Case I and II, Algorithm 1 is efficient in calculating the market equilibrium prices. We observe the linear equation sets output a unique equilibrium prices solution under dif-ferent market settings with few reductions in χ kl ij . Because the market equilibrium prices are predetermined, compared to auction markets, the overhead is significantly smaller. A SU only needs to randomly match another one to form a bargain pair. The only information exchanged between the pair is each SU's market type. The payments can be cleared when a SU leaves the market. The buyer enabled by the cognitive radio immediately switches to the new channels. Besides the property of having a low overhead, the Tier-2 market is in a distributed manner, which is more flexible and scalable than a market with a centralized server.
We next consider the special case N = 1 to obtain insights on how the market equilibrium prices are affected by various factors. When N = 1, there are four type of SUs in the market, i.e., (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1) .
The impact of matching schemes: We first compare the market equilibrium prices of the two matching schemes, i.e., Case I and Case II. For simplicity, we consider the constant traffic states, i.e., ρ 01 = ρ 10 = 0. We calculate A 10 01 , i.e., the price proposed by the type-(1 0) SU to the type-(0 1) SU.
Case I:
(29) Case II:
We have A Cp+
The fact A 10 01 > A 10 01 means that in Case I a proposer has stronger market power than that in Case II. The intuition is if the responder chooses to reject, the bargain relationship of a pair breaks down in the next slot, no matter whether they are newly matched.
The impact of population: By (29), we observe that the larger π 10 , the smaller A 10 01 . That is, a larger fraction of a type of SUs in the market will undermine the market power of that type of SU. Being a majority in the market implies that its bargain partner has more potential choices. In the market, the ability to alternative partners enhances a user's market role.
The impact of traffic dynamics: We study how traffic dynamics affect the market equilibrium prices. We consider Case I and set ρ 00 = ρ 11 = ρ. For simplicity, we consider π 00 = π 01 = π 10 = π 11 = 
We can see that a larger ρ leads to a larger A 01 10 , which indicates that keeping the same traffic state of a SU in the next slot enhances its market power. In (31), when ρ <
10 < 0. In this case, the traffic of the type-(0, 1) SU has a large probability of transiting 4 If ρ 00 = ρ 11 = ρ, we can show for arbitrary distribution of each type of SUs and arbitrary value of ρ, there always exists a set of market equilibrium prices with χ 10 01 = 1. to state 0. Then by the bargain it is more likely to become a type- (1, 0) . The type-(0, 1) SU even proposes to pay a type-(1, 0) SU. The observation indicates that fast traffic dynamics may undermine the market power of a SU. In the current slot, a SU as a buyer, may become a seller in the next slot due to traffic dynamics. Then the incentive to buy channels in the current slot is smaller. This is the reason that in some cases χ kl ij is needed to be reduced to reach a market equilibrium.
V. Evaluation
In this section, we numerically study properties of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 markets based on the theoretical results. We first focus on the Tier-1 market. In the Tier-1 market, we compare the market equilibrium prices of following cases: 1) Case I: A ∧ B, 2) Case II: A ∧ (∼ B), 3) Case III: (∼ A) ∧ B, and 4) Case IV: (∼ A) ∧ (∼ B), where A represents that the PUA is honest in announcing the number of channels it has, and B represents that the PUA does not threaten to abandon the engaged SU under disagreement. We consider the value of a piece of goods as U = 1 and the discount factor δ = 0.9. In Fig. 1(a) , we fix the number of channels as N c = 5 , and vary the total number of SUs N s from 1 to 20. In Fig. 1(b) , we have N s = 15, and vary N c from 1 to 20. We observe that p * (N c , N s ) is generally an increasing function of N s , and a decreasing function of N c , which follows the supply-and-demand market rule that the prices are decreased/increased by the increase of supply/demand. We also observe that Case IV leads to the highest market equilibrium prices for the PUA, and Case I results in the lowest. The results indicate that threatening not to bargain with the SU in the future under disagreement enhances the market power of the PUA. So does pretending to only have one channel in each transaction. The market equilibrium prices are higher in Case II than in Case III, which implies that threatening to abandon the engaged SU favors the PUA more, compared to pretending to have only one piece of channels. Note pretending to have only one piece of channels is a tactic of market manipulation and could be detected by SUs cooperation.
In Table I , we consider Case I and let N s = 4. Interest- ingly, we observe the prices are negative when N c = 4 and 5. In this case, the PUA does not choose to disagree since V p (4, 4) and V p (5, 4) are positive. Nevertheless, V p (3, 4) is even larger than V p (4, 4) , which discloses that in some cases the PUA prefers not to sell all the channels it has. We next study the market equilibriums of the Tier-2 market. We first study the difference of Case I and II. First, we consider the average proposed market equilibrium price, i.e.,Ā = , where
is the total number of pairs which have channel exchange. We set the discount factor α and the matching probability ϑ as 0.5, respectively. Transmission utility R is 10 while C p is 5. We vary N from 1 to 8. The traffic transition probability matrix, the initial channel and traffic state of each SU are generated randomly (Note the initial state is needed to calculate π ij ) in each of the 200 simulations. In Fig. 2(a) , we observe that Case I always leads to a largerĀ than II, which indicates that in general market settings, a proposer's market power is stronger in Case I than in Case II. We also observe that A is an increasing, and almost linear function of N . The intuition is that as N increases, a SU has more types of alternative partners, which increases the SU's market power. In Fig. 2(b) , we study a SU's performance in two cases. We consider T c =3000T s . The SU stays in the market for the whole T c time. We measure the SU's average utility per slot. We set ϑ = 0.1 and 0.9, respectively. The other settings are the same as Fig. 2(a) . We observe the two cases result in similar SU performance. The result show that Case I and Case II are in similar efficiency in channel exchange (Note in our simulation, we observe χ kl ij s are almost the same in the two cases). The similar performance is also because that the SU has the similar experience of market types in the two cases. When SUs enter the market with different initial state, and stay in the market for different time durations, they have different experience of market types. Different sets of market equilibrium prices result in different utilities for them. In Fig. 2(b) , we also observe that a larger ϑ leads to a higher performance, since market is more efficient in channel exchange. We next study the impact of α. A smaller α implies that SUs care more about the current utility and are thereby more aggressive in channel exchange to improve the current welfare. Recall that the sum of a pair's utility in the current slot is maximized, by χ kl ij set in (19) . We study how α impacts the number of channels exchanged between two different types of SUs. We consider the metric
, where (i,j),(k,l)χ kl ij is the sum of the number of channels exchanged between two types of SUs under our proposed market equilibriums, while χ kl ij is set as in (19) . The ratio r χ reflects the aggressiveness in channel exchange. We consider α from 0.1 to 0.9, N = 5, and ϑ = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. The other settings are the same as in Fig. 2(a) . We list the results of Case I in Table II . Note Case II has almost the same results. We observe that in Table II , the ratio r χ is very close to or equal to 1, which indicates that SUs are aggressive in channel exchange to satisfy their current traffic demands. It also implies that Algorithm 1 is very efficient in computing the market equilibriums, since few reductions in χ kl ij are needed to reach the market equilibrium. We observe a larger α leads to a smaller r χ , i.e., less aggressiveness in channels exchange, since the future traffic states may undermine the incentives of exchanging channels in the current slot. We also observe that a large ϑ promotes the aggressiveness. The reason is that the market is more efficient for channel exchange with a larger ϑ. When the number of channels a buyer obtains in the current slot is excessive for the next slot, it is more likely to be able to sell them out in a more efficient market.
A SU's equilibrium strategy is pairwise optimal when its partner adopts the strategy. We next study the temporal properties of the market equilibrium strategies. A SU has an infinite number of polices, including stationary polices and random policies. We consider a market where all the SUs adopt the market equilibrium strategy. We compare three polices of a new SU entering the market. They are 1) Agreement policy: the SU always adopts the equilibrium strategies when matched with different SUs. 2) Disagreement policy: the SU always rejects a price offer and its proposed price is rejected by its partner, and 3) Conditional agreement policy: in this policy, we assume the SU knows the distribution of its current type (i, j) in each slot t. It chooses disagreement when π i,j (t) < π i,j , since he has a stronger market power with a smaller population. Otherwise he chooses the equilibrium strategy. We vary N from 1 to 10. The other simulation settings follow Fig. 2(b) .
We also let the SU stay in the market for the whole 3000 slots. We consider the time average utility. In Fig. 3 , we observe that agreement policy always leads to the highest performance for different N , conditional agreement policy follows, and the disagreement policy is the worst. When the matching probability ϑ is larger, the performance gap between agreement and conditional agreement is larger. We note conditional agreement policy is based on the assumption that a SU knows the current market state. In practice, a SU does not know the current market states, it has no basis to deviate from the market equilibriums.
VI. Related work
Auction-based spectrum trade and access have been intensively studied toward various targets, which mainly include incentive compatibility [2] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [16] , spectrum reuse [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , auctioneer's revenue maximization [2] , [5] , [6] , [16] , social welfare maximization [3] [6] , and collusion resistance [3] . In [7] , the authors propose auction-based power allocation schemes for the SUs with a interference temperature protection for the PU.
Pricing based DSA mechanisms are also well studied in [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] . In the pricing based DSA, the SUs are less active in determining the charged prices, compared to the auction-based markets and our bargain market where SUs can bid or propose a price. In pricing based DSA paradigm, a centralized spectrum server is often needed.
Two-tier market structures have been considered in [14] , [15] , [16] , where wireless service providers (WSP) buy spectrum from a spectrum broker, and sell them to the end users. Our two-tier structure has different notions. We consider a two-tier structure in different time scales that reduces signaling overhead and enables short-term DSA. Moreover, there is no a centralized WSP in our market, where SUs buy channels directly from a PUA and redistribute them in a distributed way.
In [17] , a local bargain approach is used to allocate channels among neighbor nodes in ad hoc networks to improve spectrum utilization and fairness. They consider cooperative users. There is no price notions. In our paper, SUs are selfish and have different market roles. They need to follow a set of equilibrium prices to exchange channels.
Economic approaches have been extensively exploited to study selfish behaviors in wireless communications and networks. We do not present a comprehensive survey in this paper. Note Nash bargain solution has been applied to a lot works on network resource optimization. In [18] , the strategic bargain game is applied to the packets exchange market in a network coding based P2P system, which partially inspires our work in the Tier-2 market. Interested readers can refer to this paper as well as Chapter 2, 3, 6, and 7 in [19] for a better understanding of the decentralized bargain market and related approaches.
VII. Conclusions and future works
In this paper, we propose a two-tier market structure that enables distributed DSA for SUs with fast varying traffic demands. We first consider the Tier-1 market where spectrum is traded from a PUA to a set of SUs in a large time scale. We use Nash bargain game to derive its market equilibriums. We then propose the Tier-2 market where spectrum is redistributed among SUs to satisfy the dynamic traffic demands in a small time scale. We use strategic bargain game to determine the Tier-2 market equilibrium prices, following which the SUs exchange channels through random matching with a low overhead. We use both analytical and numerical approaches to study the supply-and-demand market properties. Generally, the threat of abandoning the bargain partner, the ability of finding alternative partners, being a minority in the market, and keeping the current traffic demands enhance the market power of a user.
To simplify the problems and focus on the essential ideas of decentralized bargain, we simplify some models in this paper. In our future work, we will further consider the following cases. First, multiple PUs and SUs trade multiple pieces of goods in Tier-1. Second, each SU has heterogenous traffic transition in Tier-2. They will make the proposed schemes more interesting and applicable.
